

Opening Ourselves to the World: Navigating a Global-Critical Curriculum

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I am very grateful for the opportunity to present at the Paideia Text and Issues Lecture series as well as in *Agora*. I would like to thank Kathryn Reed, Brian Caton, the Text and Issues Lectures committee, and Martin Klammer, the editor of *Agora*, for this opportunity. The topic of this year's Paideia Text and Issues Lecture series, "Decolonizing Paideia? Revising the Products and Process of Education," is extremely important and timely. The topic of the lecture series also coincides with and augments the DEI Action Plan of Provost Lynda Szymanski. Diversifying the campus and the curriculum need to go hand in hand. Therefore, it is an honor to kick off this lecture series. The current essay assesses existing approaches to a diversified as well as inclusive curriculum and proposes a strategy to decentralize the liberal arts that I created over the past few years and especially during my sabbatical last year. I will illustrate this method with the work of the Global-Critical Philosophy of Religion group (GCPoR), of which I am a member and co-organizer. This group, which was founded in 2015, received a Wabash Grant that is administered by Luther College and that I also serve as the Principal Investigator (PI). Its primary goal is to develop and implement strategies to "teach philosophy of religion inclusively to diverse students." The present essay 1) opens with a few preliminary reflections, 2) illustrates the current crisis of global-critical liberal arts by discussing the *status quo* of, the problems inherent in, and a new approach to the discipline of philosophy of religion, 3) analyzes the underlying obstacles that prevent us from opening ourselves to the world, 4) presents two practical approaches that I hope will enable us to do just that, and 5) identifies the goals of a decentralized liberal arts curriculum.¹

Preliminary reflections

Before we begin our journey into the vision of an inclusive liberal arts curriculum, I would like to venture a few preliminary reflections. First, while most of us strive to be fair and inclusive, we need to be aware that inclusive pedagogies and curricula have the potential to make us feel uncomfortable. They confront us with views on reality and on our self-understanding as well as histories other than our own. They raise the possibility that there are not only other ways of understanding reality and of interpreting histories other than the ones we are used to, but also world views and even academic methods that supplement the ones we have come to embrace and identify with. The reason for this is that worldviews and even academic methods not only constitute intellectual exercises but also are intimately intertwined with our self-understanding and with our identities. In other words, inclusive pedagogies and curricula require "brave spaces" (Arao and Clemens 2013), they require an environment in which we leave our comfort zone and encounter beliefs and ways of thinking that, heretofore, we assigned to an other. I will return this point later in this essay.

Inclusive pedagogies and curricula have the potential to make us feel uncomfortable.

In addition, I would like to briefly reflect on the terminology that we use to describe inclusive and diverse pedagogies and curricula. The title of the Paideia Text and Issues Lecture series asks whether it is necessary to decolonize Paideia. The titles of the three other talks in this series explic-



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itly address the need to decolonize the liberal arts and to envision humanities and sciences in the light of postcolonial studies. I agree that the liberal arts and Paideia as our flagship program need to be decolonized. As a professor and researcher of East Asian religions and philosophies I clearly see and emphatically endorse the need for postcolonial studies in my field. However, I am not the person to advance postcolonial studies. As a German, who lives in the U.S. and researches the philosophies of Japan and "around the world," I am in no position to decolonize anything, to envision postcolonial studies, or to "represent" the *subaltern*. As Gayatri Spivak has argued convincingly in her (in)famous "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1988), representation in both the sense of "speaking-for" and "presenting" silences the colonial subject and, therefore, is doomed to fail. Therefore, I propose to decentralize the liberal arts and to invite postcolonial voices into the community that envisions inclusive and diverse pedagogies and curricula.

When I decided on a title for the talk, I choose the adjective "global-critical"

intentionally for two reasons. First, the name of our group designed to make philosophy of religion more open and inclusive is “global-critical.” Second, and more importantly, this descriptor indicates both the strengths and the deficiencies of both “global” and “critical” approaches. In short, global approaches to philosophy acknowledge the need to make our discipline more inclusive, to represent a multiplicity of geographical regions and traditions, to expand our horizon, and to fashion a “philosophy around the world.” Bloomsbury Academics and our group agreed that this phrase is descriptive of our project. Global approaches focus on the scope of the discipline and expand the range of the texts, thinkers, and traditions discussed in our publications and curricula. This is the strength of this kind of approach. But it also has a weakness: It applies one particular method, mostly methods developed in Western Europe or North America, to all other traditions and texts. Critical approaches point out the dangers of hegemonic thinking that takes one cultural paradigm or the conceptual framework of what constitutes “religion” and/or “philosophy” framed in the context of one specific tradition as normative and applies it to all traditions “around the world.” Critical philosophy, contrary to global philosophy, is framed “from below” and “in a new key” (McAfee Brown 1978) and illuminates the hegemonic power structures reflected in our practice of philosophy in particular and the liberal arts in general. It encourages us to acknowledge the colonial politics of the current academia, to rethink our methodological presuppositions, and to de-colonize the philosophical discourse. It thus focuses on the meta-discourse, the examination of the method and conceptual framework that we imply and apply in philosophical discourses.

Table 1 compares global philosophy, on the one side, and the critical, postcolonial approach to philosophy of religion, on the other, with the new approach I introduce in this essay. Global philosophy implies a monistic worldview insofar as it assumes a set of universals that applies to all cultures and traditions and postulates a commonality across the borders between cultures and traditions. It employs a top down approach universalizing the methodological assumptions and the conceptual framework developed in one particular cultural setting. Postcolonial philosophy, on the other hand, advances a cultural monadology postulating the particularity of cultures, even implying cultural relativism, and privileges the principle of difference. It suggests decolonizing academia from the bottom up and gives voice to the communities previously marginalized and silenced. I believe that both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. Global philosophy asserts the common humanity shared and expressed by all traditions but assumes the power to identify and define this commonality; it postulates the universality of human rights but silences particularity and diversity in its name. Postcolonial theory highlights the particularity of specific cultures but advances general theories which ask us to listen to the marginalized, yet, as Spivak has pointed out, speak for them. To mediate between globalism and postcolonialism and to highlight the strengths of each of these approaches, I suggest a third option, cosmopolitanism (Kopf 2021). Inspired by Mutai Risaku’s 務台理作 (1890-1974) social philosophy and Anthony Appiah’s theory of cosmopolitanism (2007), I argue that cosmopolitanism reconciles these two seemingly opposing principles, the commonality of humanity and the particularity of cultures, universality and individual-

ity. The cosmopolitanism that I envision is based on the Tiantai principle “one-and-yet-many, many-and-yet-one” (Chin.: *yijiduo duojiyi* 一即多 多即一) that emphasizes commonality-in-difference and difference-in-commonality. Any philosophy as well as liberal arts that is rooted in such a cosmopolitanism is entirely decentralized. It has no beginning and no end and is based on a non-essentialist ontology assuming no center, implying no “grand narrative” (Fr.: *méta-récits*).

The main problem of philosophy of religion is that the discipline is characterized by overlapping hegemonic discourses.

Why the need for a global-critical curriculum?

To illustrate the basic need for global, postcolonial, and decentralized liberal arts, I would like to introduce the central discussion in the academic philosophy of religion to illustrate the need for a global-critical and decentralized curriculum. To do that, I have to first introduce the history of the discipline. It is not uncommon to locate the birth of this discipline in the European Christian traditions. However, that is only partially true. While it is possible to trace some of the debates that make up the canon of current philosophy of religion to Augustine (354-430) and Pelagius (360-418), its antecedents can be found in the application of Aristotelian philosophy to Islamic theology by the Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites in the ninth and tenth centuries. Islamic philosophy, in particular the works of Ibn Sīnā (980-1037) and Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), influenced medieval Jewish and Christian philosophy significantly. Philosophers such as Maimonides (1138-1204), Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), and, more broadly, European intellectuals in general inherited Aristotelian philosophy and science from the Islamic intellectual

	globalism	postcolonialism	cosmopolitanism
principle	one - universal	many - particulars	one-and-yet-many
paradigm	commonality	difference	commonality-in-difference
activity	globalizing	decolonizing	decentralizing
direction	top-down	bottom-up	no-beginning-no-end
metaphysics	monism	monadology	non-essentialism

Table 1

tradition. Be that as it may, philosophy of religion today is heavily shaped by Christian philosophers from Europe and North America.

The main problem of philosophy of religion is that the discipline is characterized by overlapping hegemonic discourses including Eurocentrism, Christocentrism, androcentrism, ethnocentrism, Anglo-phono-centrism, heteronormativity, ableism, speciesism, just to name a few. The method applied and the questions asked are not only framed within a monotheistic context, they further imply a specific normativity and a clearly recognizable vision of what religion is and who the practitioners of philosophy of religion are. One of these many hegemonic discourses that is often assumed but rarely criticized is Anglo-phono-centrism. Yet it is almost always assumed that all texts, primary or secondary, relevant to the discipline are accessible in English, i.e. either written in or translated into English. Similarly, all major conferences in the discipline are either held in or translated into English. On first sight, this seems to be mainly a practical issue. On further examination, however, one realizes that it is problematic if the relevance of conferences and publications to a discipline that focuses on the careful analysis of concepts and arguments is determined by the language in which they are held or produced. To counteract these hegemonic discourses in philosophy of religion in particular, and the liberal arts in general, an inclusive—that is, global, postcolonial, and decentralized—curriculum is necessary.

What makes the globalization, decolonization, and decentralization of the liberal arts even more difficult is that disciplines are not one dimensional but comprise at least four different discursive layers: 1) the discourse constitutes the subject and the scope of study, 2) the organizing structure provides the method of study, 3) the meta-discourse provides the horizon of study, and 4)

layers of discourse	example	approaches
discourse: subject of study	texts: (Bible, Qur'an, Sūtras, Vedas) Aquinas, Mu'tazilla, Nyāya, Dōgen	(traditional) global approaches
organizing structure of discourse: method of study	philosophy (method: questions, premises, inferences) gewu 格物, darśana, mono no aware 物の哀れ	feminist and postcolonial, critical approaches
meta-discourse: horizon of study	world view: theo/hiero-centrism, satva-centrism, bodhi-centrism	Timothy Knepper, global-critical approaches
discursive deep structure: underlying heuristic framework	basic paradigm: metanarrative (<i>métarécit</i>), small discourses (<i>petit récits</i>), philosophy of expression	Multi-Entry Approach, cosmopolitan approaches

Table 2

the discursive deep structure comprises the underlying heuristic framework and determines the form and shape of the discourse.


Table 2 classifies a variety of global-critical approaches to philosophy of religion by identifying the discursive layer they intend to diversify. Traditional global approaches such as Joseph Runzo's *Global Philosophy of Religion: A Short Introduction* (2001) diversify the subject of study and, e.g., complement sources investigated in traditional philosophical studies of religion such as Thomas Aquinas with sources produced by the Mu'tazilites, Nyāya Hinduism, or the Japanese Zen philosopher Dōgen (1200-1253). Critical approaches decolonize the organizing structure of the discipline by diversifying the method of study. The philosophical method is thus supplemented and sometimes even replaced with the Confucian "investigation of things" (*gewu* 格物), the Hindu "critical understanding" (*darśana*), and the Shintō "pathos of things" (*mono no aware* 物の哀れ). Arvind Sharma's trilogy *The Philosophy of Religion: A Buddhist Perspective, The Philosophy of Religion: A Sikh Perspective, and A Primal Perspective on Philosophy of Religion* is an example of this approach. Global-critical approaches such as Timothy Knepper's *Philosophy of Religion: A Global and Critical Approach* broaden the horizon of the study insofar as they challenge the theocentric paradigm of religion and treat, as in Knepper's case, Lakota, Yorùbá, South Asian, East Asian, and contemporary academic philosophies of religion on the same level as the traditional philosophy of religion steeped in the Abrahamic traditions. Finally, cosmopolitan approaches decentralize the discursive deep structure as well as

the underlying heuristic framework of the discipline. Later in this essay I introduce my "multi-entry approach" (hereafter abbreviated as "MEV") (Kopf 2019, 2022), which proposes to conceive of the philosophy of religion and the liberal arts as a multilogue of "small discourses" (*petit récits*), rather than one "metanarrative" (*métarécit*).

Obstacles that prevent us from opening ourselves to the world


But why is there resistance to diversifying the liberal arts curriculum on any or all of these four discursive layers? Why do most disciplines, including the sciences, replace the multiplicity of voices and traditions with a multiplicity of juxtapositions and identity conflicts? The binary framework that is expressed in our rhetoric of "East" vs. "West," "religion" vs. "science," "rational" vs. "irrational," "good" vs. "evil," and "us vs. them" is clearly indicative of identity politics. As Jessica Benjamin has argued brilliantly (1977), every binary framework will lead to hegemonic rhetoric and politics and what Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) called "the will to power." Identity politics not only bifurcates the world into two irreconcilable realms, it also leads to what J. J. Clarke calls "quasi-entities" and "cultural enclavism" (Clarke 1994, 14-15). Mutai Risaku has argued that identity formation creates a "small world" (*shōsekai* 小世界) (MRC 4: 59), that is, the illusion that our experience, our way of looking at the world, our method of study is normative. We mistake the world we experience with THE world. This is why the globalization, decolonization, and decentralization of the curriculum makes us uncomfortable: it threatens our "small world." This is why we often feel the urge to resist it.

In my sabbatical, I developed a meta-psychology to analyze the obstacles we face when we attempt to open ourselves to the world and to suggest ways to overcome these obstacles. For the sake of time/space, I focus on four out of ten metapsychological compartments.



Graph 1


Graph 1 illustrates the comportment that I call “constructing-the-other-for-onself” (對自成他). Here we live in what the comedian A. Whitney Brown calls “pre-Copernican universe,” where the “world revolves around ourselves.” When we live in our “small world” and possess an “ego-centered worldview” we construct the world as an object of our experience, understanding, and desire. To use the language of Jean Piaget (1896-1980), we “assimilate” the objects of our experience into our world and make them conform to our worldview. Jean-Paul Sartre calls this comportment “being-for-itself” (*être-pour-soi*).



Graph two

Graph 1 depicts the “encounter of self and other” (自偶他). In this *anti-thetical* encounter, two self-conscious subjects, two intentionalities, two worldviews face each other. At this point, the self is no longer able to “assimilate” the other into its world. The independent other resists the assimilation by the self. At the same time, the self feels limited and threatened by the other. Of course, we need to distinguish between threats to the very existence of the self, on


one side, and a simple challenge to the *Weltanschauung* of the self, on the other. I explore this difference in length in a recent essay (Kopf 2022). Be that as it may, there are three possible outcomes to this *anti-thetical* encounter: first, the eternal conflict between self and other, second, the subjugation of one by the other, or, third, an uneasy truce not unlike the “non-overlapping magisteria” of “science” and “religion” as suggested by Stephen Gould (1997).



Graph 3

Graph 3, “recognizing-sameness-in-difference,” (找同存異), suggests one way of how this deadlock of the *anti-thetical* encounter between self and other can be broken. The “presence of a third” (Kopf 2018) reveals the complexity of identity choices, underlying solidarity, and shifting allegiances and discloses an *a-thetic* modality. Faced with a multiplicity of interlocutors, the self finds different sets of commonalities with varying people: I might share a language with person A, a religious practice with person B, and a liking for 80s pop music with person C. All of a sudden, identity choices become more difficult than expected. This complexity disrupts the easy rhetoric of “us vs. them.” I call this modality of “recognizing-sameness-in-difference” *a-thetic* since it is no longer rooted in a self-consciously articulated *project* but rather in a “mutual feeling response” (*ganying dao jiao* 感應道交) (T 1911.46.004). This “mutual feeling response” has to be cultivated in embodied practice to shape who we are—otherwise it remains a fleeting insight.

Finally, graph 4 proposes the modality of “existing-together-complementing-each-other” (共存互補). In the same way, in which the “presence of the third” reveals the complexity of iden-



Graph 4

tity constructions, the “demand of the fourth” (Kopf 2018) brings to light that all individuals as well as all encounters between individuals do not occur in a vacuum but in a social context. The self always constitutes a self-in-a-web-of-multiplicity. The graph further indicates that the modality of “being-in-multiplicity” is not exclusive: it neither transcends nor rejects the *thetic* and *a-thetic* modalities of the self, but includes and expresses them—it is *non-thetic*. The identity of the self-in-multiplicity is neither monolithic nor permanent, but liminal. It comprises a hybrid identity. It is only then that we become multicultural, that we are open to the world, that we embrace diversity.

Table 3 suggests examples of these four compartments. “Constructing-the-other-for-onself” is expressed in the methodological solipsism of graduate students and researchers who are so immersed in their own method that they cannot imagine a different way of approaching the subject of their study. If other methods of study are encountered, they are then interpreted within the framework of one’s own method. Similarly, theology of religion “assimilates” religious systems other than one’s own into *my own* theological framework. The “encounter-of-self-and-other” illustrates an awareness of the diversity of scholarly methods and interreligious dialogue or interfaith encounters. One is aware of the other, maybe intrigued, but prefers to stay within one’s own domain and home-ground. The comportment of “recognizing-sameness-in-difference,” then, outlines the first step towards interdisciplinarity as well as the pluralistic approach to the diversity of religious systems and practices. While

知自明他: knowing-the-self-understanding-the-other	methodology	religious identity
對自成他 : constructing-the-other-for-the-self	methodological monism/solipsism	theology of religions exclusive identities
自偶遇他: self-encounters-the-other	diversity of methods	interfaith encounter
找同存異: recognizing-sameness-within-differences	interdisciplinarity	pluralism
共存互補: existing-together-complementing-each-other	multi-entry approach	hybrid identities

Table 3

still foreign, one recognizes similarities with other academic disciplines as well as religious practices and is willing to embark on the journey to a common goal. The modality of “existing together-complementing-each-other” is expressed by a multi-entry approach to philosophy, the acceptance of hybrid identities, and the sense and practice of multiple belonging. As I mentioned above, these four compartments do not outline a process from a naïve to a more mature attitude. Rather, all four attitudes are at play at any given time: we all have our own worldview and disciplinary method, we all encounter particular other worldviews and methods, and we realize that the juxtaposition of self and other is constructed and located in a web of multiplicity. Accordingly, our identities are not monolithic and exclusive but rather complex, multi-layered, and liminal.

Strategies for decentralizing the curriculum

In this section, I would like to discuss strategies to decentralize the liberal arts curriculum based on the above analysis of our resistance to engage across real and imagined boundaries and to open ourselves to the world. The first strategy is what I call “frame switching.” This is a skill commonly practiced in philosophy and religious studies classes, a skill that lies at the foundation of Knepper’s approach to philosophy of religion. Students learn not only about but also to think through multiple perspectives, positions, and systems of thought and familiarize themselves with these systems from the inside as well as the outside. Concretely, students learn to appreciate assumptions, arguments, and implications, conducting both an internal and external criticism of philo-

sophical positions framed in response to specific questions such as “who are we,” “do we have free will,” and “what is the cosmos.” Since this strategy should be common practice in philosophy of religion classes, I will not discuss it here. The strategies that I focus on here are my multi-entry approach to philosophy as well as the liberal arts and the practice of common pilgrimages. The goal of both of these practices is “knowing-the-self-understanding-the-other, knowing-the-other-understanding-the-self” (知自明他 知他明白).

I have articulated the multi-entry approach” (Kopf 2019, 2022) as a strategy to research, develop, and teach philosophy of religion in a way that acknowledges the diversity of voices “around the world.” This idea was inspired by the Buddhist image of Indra’s net—a net of diamonds, each of which reflects all other diamonds as well as the whole net in itself—and the rhizomatic model developed and suggested by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987). Both models suggest an academic discourse without a beginning/*arche*, end/*goal/telos*, or center, regardless of whether this discourse is realized as an anthology or monograph, a workshop, a textbook, or a syllabus. Each chapter/section constitutes a textbook/unit in itself and discusses the four discursive layers introduced above (discourse, structure of discourse, meta-discourse, discursive deep structure) inside out. At the same time, every chapter/section integrates all other chapters/sections in itself and provides its own rationale of how to read the book or approach the subject. Such a textbook is best written by multiple authors, each of whom presents one position/system and engages all other positions from their own perspective.

It is a little bit more difficult to apply this multi-entry strategy to the classroom, since college courses are usually taught by one faculty or a small team of two to three faculty. Therefore, our GCPoR research group is developing extensive resource materials and provides a network of expertise. Concretely,

our website connects faculty who teach philosophy of religion “inclusively to diverse students” with experts in specific traditions, positions, and methods who are willing to visit courses via online platforms such as Zoom and Skype.

Another strategy to open ourselves to the world and decentralize the curriculum is pilgrimages. Pilgrimages are usually understood as religious practices and come in various shapes and sizes. There are single-site pilgrimages such as the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela (Spain), multi-site pilgrimages such as the 88 Sacred Places in Shikoku (Japan), as well as pilgrimages that focus on the path itself rather than the goal. We tend to think that pilgrimages are designed to re-establish (*religare*) the bond between human beings and spiritual power(s) or embrace and follow the role model of religious heroes such as saints and religious founders. However, it is also possible to think of pilgrimage as transformation, charting a journey from self-doubt or “thinking” (*shirō* 思量), struggle or “not thinking” (*fushirō* 不思量), to “just doing or “without-thinking”² (*hishirō* 非思量) (DZZ vol. 1). Or translated in a language that is less cryptic, we can say that pilgrimages facilitate a transformation from ignorance via the practice of “attunement” (Nagatomo 1992) to, as the *Ten Ox Pictures* (*shiniutu* 十牛圖) of Kuonan Shiyuan 廓庵師遠 (twelfth century)³ suggest, wisdom (*prajñā*) and compassion (*karunā*). Here, “wisdom” implies understanding-the-other and “compassion” caring-for-the-other. These pictures suggest that pilgrimage constitutes liberation from self-centeredness and facilitates openness to the world.

So what does this practice, as exciting as it may be, have to do with our curriculum? The answer to this question is actually in front of us. Both pilgrimages and the liberal arts curriculum nurture “discursive self-reflection.” In both cases, we learn about ourselves, our histories, our relationship to each other, and our place in the world. The overarching themes of Paideia 111 and 112 have echoed this sentiment. Pilgrimages facilitate this kind of self-reflection even more so when they constitute the communal exploration of our identities in relation to each other. If we and the perceived other venture together on a common journey to places of significance such as memorial sites, pilgrimages cannot but facilitate reflection on our various and sometimes variant understanding of our common history and encourage a mutual exchange of these multiple and frequently divergent narratives. When the pilgrims engage each other’s experiences, narratives, and worldviews, they arrive at a recognition of our commonalities-in-difference (this includes members of the same community) and an appreciation of our common humanity.

The memorial sites that I have in mind commemorate what I call “unique inescapable ruptures” (hereafter “UIR”) (Kopf 2010). The purpose of those sites has been discussed in recent literature on the “ethics of memory” (Margalit 2004) and “dark tourism.” Having engaged with the ethics of memory for a while, especially with the work of Avishai Margalit (2004) and Sueki Fumihiko (2017), I am excited that the Center for Ethics and Public Engagement (CEPE) chose ethics of memory as its topic for this semester. Margalit proposes the importance of an ethics of memory as follows: “The difference between dwelling on humiliation and not on recognition is not the same sort of difference as that between seeing the cup half empty and seeing it half full. The difference, I believe, cuts deeper. Is it not injustice rather than justice that ‘hurts us into politics?’” (Avishai Margalit 2004, 104). Similarly, Trinh Minh Ha encourages us to walk “with the disappeared” (Trinh 2016). The experience of injustice constitutes an important starting point for social

justice, but it puts the *onus* of this work and intercultural understanding squarely on the shoulders of the oppressed, the marginalized, the silenced. I sincerely believe that it is equally important that we acknowledge and face the injustice that our communities have committed. For me as a German, who lives in the Midwest of the U.S., researches Japanese philosophy, and has taught in Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China, some of the UIRs that I have to confront are the Holocaust, the Native American genocide, the legacy of slavery and racism, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Nanjing massacre, just to name a few. Pilgrimages to memorial sites such as Dachau and Hiroshima are not easy, but they are necessary if we are serious about inclusiveness, education, and morality.

Pilgrimages to memorial sites such as Dachau and Hiroshima are not easy, but they are necessary if we are serious about inclusiveness, education, and morality.

Obviously, there are practical limitations to arranging such pilgrimages. But it is possible to start with small steps. I believe Paideia has done a wonderful job including heretofore silenced and neglected voices into our first-year program. As a college we need to keep including these voices into our curriculum. In addition, the current conversations on the reform of our general education requirement provide a wonderful opportunity to promote the study of systemic inequalities and to focus on global citizenship. In addition to these curricular changes, we could organize trips for all first-year students to the National Historic Site of Wounded Knee and Wounded Knee: The Museum in South Dakota and for all third-year students to the National Memorial for Peace and Justice as well as the Legacy Museum in Montgomery, Alabama. The Paideia Program could sponsor

the former and the CEPE the latter. Finally, if we are serious about making a commitment to global citizenship, we will enable each student to participate in study abroad and each faculty member by the end of their first sabbatical to live in a country in which English is neither the official nor the primary language. Obviously, those changes require financial and human resources. But programs like these are necessary if we truly want to be inclusive and if we are committed to truth and justice. They also help us to realize the high ideals of our mission statement: “As people of all backgrounds, we embrace diversity and challenge one another to learn in community, to discern our callings, and to serve with distinction for the common good.”

Conclusion: the goals of a decentralized liberal arts curriculum

The goal of these strategies and of global, critical, and cosmopolitan approaches to the liberal arts is “knowing-the-self-understanding-the-other” (知自明他). As long as we live exclusively in the *ego*-centered world created by our self-consciousness, we experience other people, cultures, traditions as a limitation, a threat, and—possibly—as an enemy. We are locked in *our own* world. Self-awareness, however, facilitates an understanding of our standpoint, our place in the world, and our connections with others. Knowing who we are enables us to see similarities with others and to recognize “similarities-in-difference.” Ultimately, self-awareness not only illuminates the standpoint of the self but also facilitates the path to understanding the standpoint of the other. It facilitates the insight that self and other are intrinsically intertwined: one cannot exist without the other. While the practice of pilgrimage conceived as putting-oneself-in-the-shoes-of-the-other (换位思考) that leads to the modality of existing-together-complementing-each-other requires the difficult work of pilgrimages to UIRs at one point, it also starts with little steps such as reading books written in a different part of the world that convey a heretofore unknown experience, watching foreign language films, or simply talking and listening to members of communi-

ties to which we do not belong. At institutes of higher education such as Luther College, it also includes taking classes outside one's comfort zone in disciplines and areas one is not familiar with. These little steps constitute the beginning of a journey beyond the boundaries of my own world, they help us open ourselves to the world, to navigate a global-critical curriculum, and "to serve with distinction for the common good."

NOTES

1. This essay is based on my recent publications (Kopf 2018, 2019, 2021a, 2021b, 2022a, 2022b).
2. This is Thomas P. Kasulis' translation of "hishirō" (Kasulis 1980, 73).
3. An online search of "ten ox pictures" or "ox herding pictures" and "Kuoan" will render versions of this famous series of pictures and poems.
4. This fourfold model of consciousness/awareness is mapped onto Chengguan's 澄觀 (738-839) "four dharma worlds" (si-fajie), the dharma worlds of "particulars" (shi-fajie), "universals" (li-fajie), "non-obstruction of universal and particular" (lishiwuai-fajie), and "non-obstruction among particulars" (shishiwuai-fajie) (T 1883.45.672).

Works Cited

Abbreviations:

- DZZ *Dōgen zenji zenshū* 道元禪師全集 [Complete Works of Zen Master Dōgen]. 2 vols. Ed. Dōshū Ōkubo. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1969-1970).
- MRC *Mutai risaku chosakushū* 務台理作著作集 [Collected Works of Mutai Risaku]. 9 vols. (Tokyo: Kobushi Shobō, 2000-2002).
- NKZ *Nishida kitarō zenshū* 西田幾多郎全集 [Complete Works of Kitarō Nishida]. 20 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988).
- T *Taishō daizōkyō* 大正大藏經 [Buddhist Canon - The Taishō Version], ed. by Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Kankōkai. 1961).

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