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Value

by Maki Sato

Conceptual definition

The concept of good and evil originates from being pure/clean (jo, 浄) or not (fujo, 不浄). As Shinto considers all spirits (tama, 霊) as being neutral, whether a phenomena or objects turn into good or evil depends on how the spirits are treated with purity and honesty (myojoshojiki, 明浄正直) by human beings. Because of their inherent value-neutrality, invisibility, and lack of bodies, spirits can also descend on words. In other words, it is believed that words also have their own inherent spiritual power, known as kotodama (言霊). The spirituality within words is believed since around the seventh-century Heian period. Such spirituality embedded in words are given value through spoken words, through norito (祝詞). Norito can be either yogoto (寿詞, words of happiness), haraenokotoba (祓詞, words for cleansing), or juso (呪詛, words for cursing).  

Philosophical significance

Individual human beings can also be objects upon which the spirit descends. Kuchiyose (口寄せ) is performed in order to listen to what the spirits have to say through language via a person, often a woman (miko, 巫女). Words that are from god spirits are called shinchoku (神勅) and such acts are called takusen (entrusted-words託宣). Moreover, there are no sacred texts in Shinto. Because non-visible and value-neutral of thinking grounds in Shinto, human individuals are supposed to be the ones who need to be clean and honest and lead lives of diligence and self-discipline.

Historical context

The concept of value-neutrality and such understandings that it is reflected in the act of words, kotodama, can be found in Kojiki (古事記, 712). The concept of Freedom is not explicitly written or explained in Shinto. Therefore, it is almost impossible to identify when the term appeared. However, the concept of kami as freed from a) ontic object (the spirits can descend on anything, or it can appear itself through natural phenomena), b) sacred text (sacred texts do not exist in Shinto), c) the notion of good and evil, exists from the establishment of Shinto through Japanese encounters with Buddhism around the eighth century.

Related terms in historical context

Body/Embodiment and Body-Value-freed-Spirit (tama): the idea of body/embodiment in relation to invisibility and value-neutrality,the idea of tama strongly relates to kotodama.

Marebito(稀人): originally means “guest.” Origuchi Shinobu (折口信夫, 1887–1953) call the ancestral spirits as marebito that peridoically brings luck and good when the ancestral spirits are treated well. Origuchi, as an anthropologist, analysed that matsuri (festival, 祭)

References

Kasulis, T. P., 1948-. 2004. Shinto. Honolulu: University of Hawaiʿi Press.

伊藤, 聡(1961-). 2012. 神道とは何か : 神と仏の日本史 / 伊藤聡著. 中公新書. 東京: 中央公論新社.

鎌田, 東二(1951-). 1999. 神道用語の基礎知識 / 鎌田東二編著. 角川選書. 東京: 角川書店.

國學院大學日本文化研究所. 1999. 神道事典 / 國學院大學日本文化研究所編集. 縮刷版 ed. 東京: 弘                                  文堂. An encyclopedia of Shinto = Shintô Jiten [神道事典]. Tokyo: Institute for                                  Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University.

佐藤, 弘夫(1953-). 2021. 日本人と神 / 佐藤弘夫著. 講談社現代新書. 東京: 講談社.

島薗, 進(1948-). 2010. 国家神道と日本人 / 島薗進著. 岩波新書. 東京: 岩波書店.

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Freedom/Liberty

by Maki Sato

Conceptual definition

The belief system of Shinto thinks highly of spirit[PDM1]  (tama, 御霊) that descend on any objects. The spirit is occasionally personified, sometimes with given names (e.g., Amaterasu oomikami, 天照大神), but unnamed spirits also exist that show and prove their existence through particular objects or natural phenomena. Because of kami’s inherent invisibility and the flexibility of not possessing substance as proof of its presence, kami is freed from ontic existentialism. In other words, kami is everywhere, and kami is nowhere. Such ambivalent existence enables kami to unite with nature per se, with living/posthumous human beings (arahitogami, 現人神), and with icons in other religions. For example, kami unites with the bodhisattvas of Buddhism (bosatsu, 菩薩) and with Indian-derived religious icons (e.g., Saraswati, benzaiten, 弁財天). The unification between Shinto and Buddhism is called honjisuijaku (本地垂迹), which was crystallized and sophisticated in the medieval era (chusei, 中世).

Additionally, because of kami’s inherent characteristics deriving from nature per se, there is no inherent evil or good attached to the concept of kami. The spirit of kami and human beings are thought to be made of one-soul-four-spirits (ichireishikon, 一霊四魂). One-soul is named naobi (直霊); four-spirits are aramitama (raging, fierce, 荒魂), nigimitama (harmonious, calm, 和魂), sakimitama (wealth, happiness, 幸魂), kusimitama (health, wonder, 奇魂). Depending on the environment and circumstances, a soul shows different facets in the form of spirits. For example, Sugawara-no-michizane (菅原道真, 845–903), who is worshipped as kami in the well-known shrine of Kita-no-tenmangu (北野天満宮), was first regarded as aramitama or more of a cursing god (tatarigami, 祟神). He was believed to have become a cursing god and punished his political opponents posthumously. However, because of the rituals to pray for his spirits to be in peace, he gradually became a kami for studies (gakumon, 学問) and is worshipped elsewhere in Japan.

Reflexive to such kami notion freed from ontic existence and freed from the static notion of good and evil requires human beings to self-discipline themselves and stay honest based on one’s decisions. In other words, kami shows various aspects of oneself dependent on the situation in requesting truth and righteousness (makoto, 真). Moreover, there are no sacred texts, such as sutras, that human beings or kami can refer to for the righteous justifiable judgment. Therefore, Shinto is freed from static judgement, but it is ever-changing, and all the righteous judges are dependent on one’s righteous work of the mind. Cleanliness is required to keep one’s mind right. Thus, misogi (cleansing of the body, 禊) and harae (cleansing via rituals and spoken words 祓) become essential.

Philosophical significance

The persistence of self through self-discipline and keeping a righteous mind (makoto-no-kokoro) was first argued by Motoori Norinaga (本居宣長, 1730–1801) through his establishment of kokugaku (study on Japanese classic literature, 国学). His initial intention was to quest for the ancient Japanese authentic mind. Through the careful reading of Kojiki (712, 古事記) and Nihonshoki (720, 日本書紀), Norinaga gradually attempted to find a pure Shinto in the classic Japanese texts. Before Norinaga, Hayashi Razan (林羅山, 1583–1657) argued about the similarity between Confucius and Shinto (jukashinto, 儒家神道). Norinaga’s works are a success by Hirata Atsutane (平田篤胤, 1776–1834).[PDM2]    

Historical context

The concept of Freedom is not explicitly written or explained in Shinto. Therefore, it is almost impossible to identify when the term appeared. However, the concept of kami as freed from a) ontic object (the spirits can descend on anything, or it can appear itself through natural phenomena), b) sacred text (sacred texts do not exist in Shinto), c) the notion of good and evil, exists from the establishment of Shinto through Japanese encounters with Buddhism around the eighth century.

Historical uses

Historically, there are various human beings who became kami in Japan (e.g., Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 豊臣秀吉 became Toyokunidaimyojin, 豊国大明神 and Tokugawa Ieyasu, 徳川家康became Toshodaigongen, 東照大権現). Human beings can become kami posthumously, freed from this-worldliness (gensei, 現世).

Relationships to other terms

Masuraoburi/Taoyameburi (ますらおぶり、たおやめぶり): The term identified by Motoori Norinaga through his careful study of ancient texts. There are kami with a given gender, but there are more neutral kami without a specified gender. Norinaga invented the term to explain an inclination to a certain gender from neutrality, becoming a man or a woman. Norinaga also used the term in explaining the culture of warriors as masurao in the twelfth century in contrast with taoyame, an aristocratic culture of Heian.

Related terms

Emic

Conscience: the idea of inner kami (uchinaru kami) and its emergence and refinement concerning the introduction of Confucius and Christianity to Japan, in contrast to Buddhism that polished somewhat an externality of conscience.

Value-neutral: since the notion of kami is freed from the sense of evil and good, kami may cause problems to humans (e.g., natural phenomena such as thunder, storms, and pandemics) when human beings and kami are not in a harmonious relationship. Kami requires purity and honesty (shojiki, 正直). Therefore, human beings are constantly required to question their daily life practices, which leads to developing a conscience.

Pantheism:kami could descend on any object, including the spoken words (kotodama). Therefore, everything in nature can do both good and evil to human beings, including languages. 

Truthfulness/Honesty: makoto no kokoro

Kokoro: heart-mind

Etic

Mergeable (自由、融合可能性), Syncretism (人神), Self-disciplined(自律)

References

Kasulis, T. P., 1948-. 2004. Shinto. Honolulu: University of Hawaiʿi Press.

伊藤, 聡(1961-). 2012. 神道とは何か : 神と仏の日本史 / 伊藤聡著. 中公新書. 東京: 中央公論新社.

鎌田, 東二(1951-). 1999. 神道用語の基礎知識 / 鎌田東二編著. 角川選書. 東京: 角川書店.

國學院大學日本文化研究所. 1999. 神道事典 / 國學院大學日本文化研究所編集. 縮刷版 ed. 東京: 弘                                  文堂. An encyclopedia of Shinto = Shintô Jiten [神道事典]. Tokyo: Institute for                                  Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University.

佐藤, 弘夫(1953-). 2021. 日本人と神 / 佐藤弘夫著. 講談社現代新書. 東京: 講談社.

島薗, 進(1948-). 2010. 国家神道と日本人 / 島薗進著. 岩波新書. 東京: 岩波書店.

 [PDM1]The use of singular spirit/plural spirits is inconsistent, but I was not sure how intentional that was or if it was a problem of translation.  

 [PDM2]I am not sure what this sentence means. Was Hirata Atsutane a champion of Norinaga? An intellectual heir?

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Tama

by Maki Sato

Tama – Body/Embodiment and Body-Value-freed-Spirit

Conceptual definition

Shinto believes that kami does not have its own body, but it is a pure spirit (tama, たま or mitama, 御霊). Therefore, the sacred spirits need to borrow or rely on objects so that they can appear and communicate with human beings. Most of the time, the sacred spirits use objects in nature as their object or place of descent (yorishiro, 依代 or mitamashiro, 御霊代). Other times, the sacred spirits may use (descend on, kourin, 降臨) human bodies or living bodies of animals to reveal themselves. In the shrines, something like a mirror, sword (tsurugi, 剣), jewel stone (gyoku, 玉), and column (hashira, 柱) is thought to be the object where kami arrives. Occasionally, a temporal shrine (himorogi,神籬), set up with bamboo and tree branches, is made to call for the spirit to descend. In nature, leaves, trees, waterfalls, mountains, capes, and rocks are believed to be where kami prefers to come down and settle (yadoru, 宿る). In other words, kami is not visible to us human beings, but it visualizes itself through the sacred objects and landscapes in nature. Because of its inherent invisibility, kami can be everywhere and in any being. Once the kami is thought to have descended, the object or the landscape it occupies becomes a sacred body (shintai, 神体).

Philosophical significance

The concept of spirit (tama,たま or mitama, 御霊) includes spirits’ given personhood (jinkaku, 人格). However, they are mostly thought of as sacred spirits deriving from a motif from the nature and natural phenomena (such as volcanic eruption), as can be read in the Kojiki (古事記, 712) and Nihonshoki (日本書紀, 720). Shinto’s concept of spirit is unique in that all the spirits have both good and evil aspects. Therefore, there is no rigid dualistic concept of good and evil in Shinto spiritualism (Kamata, 1999: 77), which allows the spirits to be free from the short-sightedness of human concepts of good and evil. In other words, there is no spirit which is purely good or purely evil. Moreover, among the spirits, there are no dualistic or antagonistic frictions (though they occasionally fight with each other for other reasons, such as irritation or jealousy). However, as seen by human beings, phenomena happen within the spirits’ relationship of relativity, generation (creation), and change because of the moving and changing process of the spirits.

In short, because of the inherent concept of invisibleness and its freedom from the dualism of good/evil, tama descends as a terror to human beings using natural phenomena such as earthquakes, pandemics, and famine. There will be fertility and prosperity when the tama is peaceful and harmonious among themselves and with human beings. Thus, the liberty of Shinto spirits to embody themselves in objects and phenomena that are contingently regarded as good and evil in human society becomes the grounding reason for human beings to both fear and revere them[PDM1] . The contingent moods of the spirits force human beings to make a continuous effort to apprehend the spirits, which becomes the key to staying in harmony with Japanese spirits.

Historical context

The concept of the spirits (mitama) descending to objects and the descended object becoming a kami-embodied object (shintai, 神体) first appears in the Kojiki (古事記, 712) and Nihonshoki (日本書紀, 720). In both Kojiki and Nihonshoki, it is written that Amaterasu (the Sun Goddess) gave her grandson, Niniginomikoto (the ancestor of the emperor), the mirror, sword, and stone jewel as signifiers of spirituality at the time of his earthly descent. However, the word itself, kami-embodied object (shintai, 神体), appears around the mid-Heian period.  

Figures, texts or sources that established the term

The word shintai (神体) appears in the first Japanese dictionary, Irohajiruishou (色葉字類抄)1144–1165, Tachibana Tadakane (橘忠兼). [PDM2] As explained above, the term used is an object where the spirit descents.

Historical uses

The word shintai itself is not commonly used. However, the kami-embodied object concept is still commonly accepted in the twenty-first century. The object where the spirit descends is called yorishiro (依代). When spirits descend upon trees, they become shinboku (神木). Rocks upon which spirits descend are called iwakura (磐座) or iwasaka (磐境). Such kami-embodied objects (shintai, 神体) become objects of worship.

Relationships to other terms

Kotodama (言霊): relates to words and phrases (koto, 言) having their spirit (tama, 霊).

Significant references/uses

It is not easy to trace the exact influences of Shinto on Japanese thoughts in general. Because of historical complexity and the interrelationship between Buddhist thoughts and Shinto, one can only assume that there are influences from Shinto ideology even still among contemporary scholars of philosophy.

Japanese contemporary phenomenologist Omori Shozo (大森荘蔵, 1921–1997) discusses the relationship between phenomenology (a bodily sensation that is only detected by the subject) and emotion (ujou, 有情) from a phenomenological viewpoint. Yuasa Yasuo (湯浅泰男, 1925–2005), known as a philosopher who first discussed qi in the Japanese context, focuses mainly on the problem of the body in contrast to mind and reason. In later years, Yuasa also discussed the relationship between qi and body.

Related terms

Emic

Conscience: the idea of inner kami (uchinaru kami) and its emergence and refinement concerning the introduction of Confucianism and Christianity to Japan, in contrast to Buddhism that polished somewhat an externality of conscience.

Value-neutral: since the notion of kami is freed from the sense of evil and good, kami may cause problems to humans (e.g., natural phenomena such as thunder, storms, and pandemics) when human beings and kami are not in a harmonious relationship. Kami requires purity and honesty (shojiki, 正直). Therefore, human beings are constantly required to question their daily life practices, which leads to developing a conscience.

Pantheism:kami could descend on any object, including spoken words (kotodama). Therefore, everything in nature can do both good and evil to human beings, including languages. 

Etic

Yuru-chara (ゆるキャラ): Hiroo Sato (佐藤弘夫) argues that the Japanese affection and passion for inventing new characters may derive from the internalized idea of kami. For example, to provide a visual body to the prefecture as a prefectural character. See, e.g., Kumamon, Bally-san, Funasshi.

References

Kasulis, T. P., 1948-. 2004. Shinto. Honolulu: University of Hawaiʿi Press.

伊藤, 聡(1961-). 2012. 神道とは何か : 神と仏の日本史 / 伊藤聡著. 中公新書. 東京: 中央公論新社.

鎌田, 東二(1951-). 1999. 神道用語の基礎知識 / 鎌田東二編著. 角川選書. 東京: 角川書店.

國學院大學日本文化研究所. 1999. 神道事典 / 國學院大學日本文化研究所編集. 縮刷版 ed. 東京: 弘                                  文堂. An encyclopedia of Shinto = Shintô Jiten [神道事典]. Tokyo: Institute for                                  Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University.

佐藤, 弘夫(1953-). 2021. 日本人と神 / 佐藤弘夫著. 講談社現代新書. 東京: 講談社.

島薗, 進(1948-). 2010. 国家神道と日本人 / 島薗進著. 岩波新書. 東京: 岩波書店.

 [PDM1]I would consult the author to make sure that this edit does not interfere with her intended meaning.

 [PDM2]I am not sure what is happening here, so I don’t want to mess with it. My guess is that Irohajiruishou is the title of the dictionary and Tachibana Tadakane is its writer/compiler/creator? It seems likely that 1144-1165 are the years he was alive, but they could also maybe be page numbers? I would consult the author.

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Upayoga

by Marie-Helene Gorisse

Conceptual definition

At the heart of Jainism is the belief that every living being is the transitory embodiment of a permanent Self (jīva) and individuals are meant to progress until they reach a state at which their Self is no longer embodied again. Embodied, the Self is co-extensive with the body it occupies, like light in a room, and this is what explains why we have sensations from the top of our head to the tips of our toes. However, the innate cognitive powers of the Self are obstructed by this entanglement, especially when it comes to karmic matter. While liberated, the Self is essentially unobstructed consciousness whose experience (upayoga, uvaoga) consists of cognition (jñāna) and intuition (darśana).

Furthermore, not only Jainism is the teaching of those worshiped beings who are unobstructed cognition and unobstructed intuition, but we too are, in principle, similar omniscient Selves. Consequently, we can know what is beyond the mundane, human epistemic range, either thanks to an openness to this higher order of being within ourselves through meditative practices; or by relying on the Scriptures—the teaching of the liberated beings—which, in turn, can be fully understood only by beings with a similar mind.

Philosophical significance

An important theme in mainstream Western philosophy of religion is the tension that exists between faith, belief, and reason. In fact, a prevalent number of discussions are articulated around this tension and on what counts as good evidence to support a given worldview. For instance, should one entrust the regulated use of the epistemic abilities of human beings within their inherent limitations, or should one rather entrust the transformative experience ensured by religious practices, the testimony of miracle, or the shared observation that good, morality, and harmony exist in the world, etc.? In this dynamic, does science discredit religion? And what about the epistemic status of intuitions? In these discussions, theistic arguments usually tend to show that faith is only seemingly, but not in truth, contrary to reason.

An interesting feature of Jainism is that its religious practices aim at the practitioner’s liberation from wrong beliefs (mithyātva), which is the final step before her liberation from the infinite circle of rebirths. In such a perspective, the exercise of consciousness as cognition has a central position, while intuition—which includes the closest equivalent to faith (śraddhā)—is a preliminary requisite meant to ensure that one has the correct mindset thanks to which the transformative practices of Self-realization can happen, hence shifting the complementarity and tension between faith, belief, and knowledge.

Historical context

In South Asian philosophico-religious traditions, the divine, the absolute, is usually, primarily consciousness (cit), cognition/knowledge (jñāna), insight (prajñā), the subject of experience (puruṣa), or the Seer (draṣṭṛ). Jain conceptions of the Self (ātman, jīva) as unobstructed cognition, unobstructed intuition, unobstructed bliss, and unobstructed energy, which focus on the cognitive part of these items, are no exception to this state of affairs. Nor is the fact that our spiritual progress consists of a path that is both virtuous and epistemic up to omniscience. In fact, even though the oldest Jain texts say very little on the Self, they already agree on characterizing it in terms of consciousness. For example, in the canonical On Behaviour, Āyāraṃga Sutta (ĀS, written in early Ardhamāgadhī in 3-2 BCE), even though an apophatism according to which the Self is not long, nor small, nor round, etc. is developed, even there, it is said “that which is the Self is that which knows, that which is the knower is the Self, that by which one knows is the Self” (ĀS 171) and “while having knowledge and intuition, there is no condition of (this) unconditioned (Self)” (ĀS 176).

Umāsvāmin and Kundakunda are the two authors who systematize a classical Jain epistemology and ontology out of these canonical texts. To begin with, the first chapter of the seminal Treatise on What there is, Tattvārthasūtra (TS, written in Sanskrit in 350–400, allegedly by someone called Umāsvāmin, probably by an unknown author), is devoted to the seven categories of reality and describes the many ways of knowing them. The following chapters are then dedicated to a detailed analysis of each category, starting with the Self (jīva). There, the defining characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the Self is experience [of consciousness] (upayoga) (TS 2.8). Further on, the Commentary on the treatise on what there is, Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya (TSBh, written in Sanskrit by Umāsvāti in 400–450) divides this cognitive operation into cognition (jñāna) and intuition (darśana) (TSBh 2.9.1). This gives rise to two lengthy classifications. First, a taxonomy within which all living beings are classified depending on the number of sense faculties they possess and can use when experiencing the world around them, and on whether or not they have a mind, from one-sensed beings like an earth-being to five-sensed beings like humans. Second, a full-fledged epistemology which will be the basis of a tradition of systematic inquiry on our knowledge faculties, from the functioning of inferential reasoning, to that of perception or of verbal testimony. Most of what is called “Jain philosophy” actually consists in these treatises of epistemology.

The second major author is Kundakunda. Kundakunda is actually not a single author, but the name that stands for the collective authorship of a Jain textual tradition (composed in Prakrit, more precisely in Jain Śaurasenī, between the third and ninth centuries around Karnataka). This tradition includes the Essence of the self, Samayasāra (SSā), which presents the Self in similar lines: “The essential characteristic of the Self as seen by the omniscient is permanently exercise [of consciousness] (uvaoga)” (SSā 1.24). However, this tradition differs from canonical and classical Jainism, and will be the basis for a mystical branch in Jainism. There, it is considered that the Self is never genuinely bound with karmic matter. Therefore, the practices which aim at a gradual dissociation between the Self and karmic matter and which are traditionally associated with Jainism, like endurance of hardships, restrained and careful acts towards all living beings, penances, or the study of the Scriptures, are dismissed as “worldly practices.” Indeed, since the Self is bound with karmic matter only from a conventional perspective, then the one who knows from the ultimate perspective realizes that in fact, the Self has never been genuinely bound. Henceforth, the direct inward experience that is Self-knowledge is the only practice that matters. Kundakunda wants us to realise that this is actually the core message of Mahāvīra, since Mahāvīra advocated meditative practices on the Self as the culmination of rigorous asceticism.

Significant references/uses

First, Jain views on what the exercise of consciousness consists of and how this defines the Self and distinguishes it from every unconscious thing are likely to give new perspectives of the hard problem of consciousness. Especially since there is the belief that a concrete change within the substance of the Self has to happen for it to be disassociated from the body and karmic matter. There is not much done on these subjects currently, but one should investigate the precise karmic associations, types of bodies and many metaphors (alloy between gold and silver) with this in mind. This will also help scholars to understand the intricate relationship between the ontological and the epistemological in Jainism.

Second, this splitting of the exercise of consciousness into cognition and intuition is also most likely to shed new light on the epistemological status of diverse faculties.

Related emic terms

Self (ātman, jīva), cognition (jñāna), intuition (darśana), obstructed and unobstructed by karmic matter, sense faculties of living beings, faculties of knowledge, wrong beliefs (mithyātva), faith (śraddhā), Self-knowledge, meditation

Related etic terms

Faith, belief, reason, intuitions, hard problem of consciousness

List of references

ĀS = Āyāraṃgasutta. In Kumar, Muni Mahendra (tr.): Āyāro (Ācārāṅga Sūtra). Jain Canonical Text Series 1. New Delhi: Today and tomorrow’s Printers & Publishers, 1981.

Bajželj, Ana. “Kundakunda on Modal Modifications of Omniscient Jīvas.” In N.Balbir and P.Flügel (eds.): Jaina Studies. Selected Papers presented in the ‘Jaina Studies’ Section at the 16th World Sanskrit Conference, Bangkok Thailand and the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto Japan. DK Publishers, New Delhi 2018: 97–111.

Bajželj, Ana. “The Jain Ontological Model according to Kundakunda and Umāsvāti.” Asian Studies 1.17, 2013: 3–16.

Balcerowicz, Piotr. “The philosophy of mind of Kundakunda and Umāsvāti,” in: Jonardon Ganeri (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017: 190–208.

Bronkhorst, Johannes. “Kundakunda and Sāṃkhya on the soul.” In N. Balbir (ed.): Svasti. Essays in honour of Prof. Hampa Nagarajaiah for his 75th Birthday. Muddushree Granthamala Series 75. K. S. Muddappa Smaraka Trust, Bangalore 2010: 215–226.

Den Boer, Lucas. Early Jaina Epistemology. A Study of the Philosophical Chapters of the Tattvārthādhigama with an English Translation of the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya I, II.8-25, and V, PhD dissertation, not yet published, defended in April 2020.

Gorisse, Marie-Hélène. “Characterising the Self: Knowledge and liberation in the Samayasāra“. In Cāruśrī. Essays in honour of Svastiśrī Carukīrti Bhaṭṭāraka Paṭṭācārya, Hampasandra Naganarajaiah and Jayandra Soni (eds.), Sapna Book House, Bangalore, 2019: pp. 95-107

Jaini, Padmanabh S. The Jaina Path of Purification. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.

Johnson, William J. “Kundakunda. Two standpoints and the socio-religious function of Anekāntavāda.” In N.K.Wagle and O.Qvarnström (eds.): Approaches to Jain Studies, Center for South Asian Studies, University of Toronto, 1999: 101–112.

. Harmless souls: Karmic bondage and change in early Jainism with special reference to Umāsvāti and Kundakunda. In: Lala Sundar Lal Jain Research Series 9. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995.

SSā = Samayasāra of Kundakunda. (1) Chakravarti, A (ed., tr. and comm.): Ācārya Kundakunda’s Samayasāra. Benares 1950 (5th ed. Bharatiya Jnanpith, New Delhi 2008). (2) Jaini, J. L. (ed., tr. and comm.): Samayasara by Shri Kunda Kunda Acharya. Sacred Books of the Jainas 8, The Central Jaina Publishing House, Lucknow 1930. (3) Zaveri, Jethalal, (ed., tr. and comm.): Samayasāra by Ācārya Kundakunda. Jain Vishva Bharati University, Ladnun 2009.

Soni, Jayandra. “Upayoga according to Kundakunda and Umāsvāti.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 35.4, 2007: 299–311.

Tatia, Nathmal. Studies in Jaina Philosophy. In Sanmati Publication 6. Calcutta: The Modern Art Press, 1951.

TS = Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāmin. In Tatia, Nathmal (tr.): That which is. Tattvārthasūtra. A Classic Jain Manual for Understanding the True Nature of Reality. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994.

TSBh = Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya of Umāsvāti, ibid.

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Mokṣa

Conceptual definition

Liberation (designated by Sanskrit terms including mokṣa, mukti, nirvāṇa, kaivalya, apavarga, and others) is release from the cycle of life and death fueled by karma, i.e., actions and their results. A variety of South Asian philosophies that disagree on many other fundamental issues agree on this much: that since life intrinsically involves suffering—since birth necessarily brings in its train old age, sickness, and death—liberation from the same is the summum bonum. Karma not only fuels the cycle (saṃsāra) but is fueled by it too. It is thus usually considered to require immense time and effort, not to mention great good fortune, to break the cycle and be released from the bondage (bandha) of suffering, ignorance, and finitude generally.

Philosophical significance

Freedom has been a central concern of philosophers in far-flung places and times, but takes very different shapes depending on the conditions from which one seeks to be free and the goods that one hopes to be free to attain. Although set in culturally-specific cosmological frameworks, the basic South Asian concept of liberation captures certain elements that should be acceptable to any theorist of freedom, namely: the conditions from which liberation is sought are characterized by limitation and suffering; the limitations in question are imposed upon our actions and their results; but our actions, with the help of knowledge, may transcend these conditions to attain ultimate satisfaction. Such a view of liberation can be placed in fruitful dialogue with accounts of the metaphysics and ethics of free will, the philosophy of intentional action, and political discourses of emancipation.

Historical context

As far as we can tell from the Rig Veda—the oldest South Asian liturgies known—liberation did not much figure into the early Vedic religion, which focused instead on the rewards of ritual in this world and in the next. In the middle of the 1st millennium B.C.E., however, the cyclic view of life appeared and a great shift occurred in which endless births and deaths came to appear rather tiresome and painful. In the Upaniṣads are found some of the earliest mentions of karma as an ethically-charged determinant of one’s worldly fate and the importance of transcending its bondage. In the canonical Buddhist diagnosis from around the same time, the source of this bondage and suffering is ultimately desire and its solution is detachment.

Beginning in the same period, the Jains—followers of the Jinas, literally “conquerers” of the afflictions of life—draw the contours of liberation into particularly sharp relief. From the earliest Jain scriptures, karma is a material substance that binds the spirit to the world, obstructing and distorting one’s vision and knowledge in the process. Through moral and yogic practices that quell the passions and minimize the negative impact of one’s actions upon other sentient beings, the Jain path of purification seeks to expurgate karma and stop any further influx into the soul.

Thus one develops right vision, knowledge, and conduct, which consummate in omniscience (kevala/kaivalya), as described by the authoritative Sanskrit catechism That Which Is (Tattvārthasūtra) of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmi around the middle of the first millennium C.E. Some benign karma may remain after the most deleterious kind is removed, allowing a omniscient master to remain embodied in the world and teach for a period. Ultimately, though, a soul that has attained such a level will be perfected (siddha), having transcended all karmic action and now experiencing its eternally pure nature of consciousness and bliss at the roof of the universe where it has arisen after jettisoning its karmic burden. Purged of adventitious baggage, the soul is now pure and thus essentially identical to every other perfected soul. It does not, however, lose its individuality as imagined in Vedantic monism or Buddhist idealism: it maintains its particular identity and differentiation according place, time, state, and even shape, as well as various more arcane parameters.

Such temporary persistence of karma and ultimate retention of elements of individuality may seem to compromise the degree of transcendence offered by the Jain notion of liberation. But it serves the important function of maintaining the coherence and salience of the very notion of karma and the yogic practices meant to eliminate it. These practices seem fruitless in the most gnoseological forms of Vedānta and Buddhism: if liberation solely requires dissociation from the gratuitious aspects of one’s personality and the insight that one truly is not who one usually takes oneself to be, karma turns out to be an illusion and one can apparently dispense with the physical ascetic practices that target it.

This tension between asceticism and a purely gnoseological approach to liberation is felt acutely in the eminent Jain philosopher Kundakunda during the period of Umāsvāmi. Many philosophers in the ensuing millennium wrestle with this tension and resolve it in their own ways; but it is not until the rather heterodox Adhyātma movement at the dawn of modernity that Jain thinkers inspired by Kundakunda boldly disclaim the importance of all external practices, favoring the liberating power of inner faith.

Overview of significant references/uses

Jaini’s is the classic work on the purificatory path of asceticism seeking liberation, although it is surprisingly silent on the nature and achievement of liberation itself. Potter’s rather idiosyncratic reading of the basic concerns of Indian philosophy centers liberation and provides an unusual treatment of the Jain theory of relations. Tatia reviews Jain criticisms of other philosophical attempts to reconcile gnoseological liberation with the metaphysics of the soul and karma. Johnson reads Kundakunda’s ambivalence between asceticism and gnoseology sociologically as a capitulation to the laity’s need for opportunities to pursue liberation without having to go in for the full renunciation required of mendicant specialists.

Related terms

Emic

mokṣa, mukti, nirvāṇa, kevala, kaivalya, apavarga, saṃsāra, karma, bandha, tapas, siddha

Etic

Liberation, freedom, bondage, renunciation, ascesis, asceticism, identity

References

Jaini, Padmanabh S. The Jaina Path of Purification. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.

Johnson, W. J. Harmless Souls: Karmic Bondage and Religious Change in Early Jainism with Special Reference to Umāsvāti and Kundakunda. 1st ed. Lala Sunder Lal Jain Research Series, vol. 9. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1995.

Potter, Karl H. Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1991.

Tatia, Nathmal. Studies in Jaina Philosophy. Sanmati Publication 6. Banaras: Jain Cultural Research Society, 1951.

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Identity

by Anil Mundra

Conceptual definition

Most generally, identity is what any thing is. In South Asian philosophy of religion, a most pressing question has always been the question of personal identity: what a person really is. This is usually phrased as the problem of the nature of the self (ātman) in Sanskritic contexts; but these discussions very often involve the more general issues of ontological identification, especially in Jain and Buddhist discussions. What makes something the thing that it is, in contradistinction to other things? Does it possess a stable nature (svabhāva) that defines it? If it does, what is the connection between tokens of a type (sāmānya) of things with the same nature? How to understand a thing’s persistence through time, particularly if it is observed to change—is it the self-same thing after the change, or has the original thing passed out of existence to be replaced by something else?

Philosophical significance

These are questions that have vexed philosophers of various stripes. Many have doubted whether there can be any rigorous concept of identity generalizable across the various contexts in which it is customarily called upon, and whether it is even possible to stipulate the concept without either circularity or incoherence. Part of the problem is that there are at least two basic acceptations of the term: most contemporary metaphysicians prioritize what they call “numerical identity” or “self-sameness”—a thing’s simply being itself—over what is currently the more colloquial sense that classifies an individual in a class with others of its own kind on the basis of some quality, such that an individual can be said to “have” an identity, or even have various identities. This disjunction between what we can call “numerical identity” and “qualitative identity” coheres with an Aristotelian metaphysic that tends to cleave self-subsisting substance from the attributes that it possesses. Some South Asian philosophers, however, resist this presumption of the priority of substance to quality.

Historical context

The earliest Vedic Upanishads are famous for their inquiries into the self and their various grand pronouncements about who and what we really are. They often tend to identify oneself with one’s consciousness, not unlike some early modern Western philosophers, although they do not always equate consciousness with intellection and emotion. The Sāṃkhya philosophy is a radical instance of identifying the person (puruṣa) with consciousness as distinguished from all mental functions and even ego, which are placed along with material objects on the side of heterogeneous nature. The Jain philosophical tradition agrees that consciousness is an essential characteristic of the soul; but this may not exhaust the Jain view of the self.

One of the standard criteria of personal identity is the presupposition, shared amongst all Indian philosophers, that anything deserving to be called one’s true identity must be in some way permanent. Something flitting in and out of existence can hardly be said to count as oneself. But according to scholastic Buddhist metaphysics, everything is in constant flux from moment to moment  and there is nothing at all having a stable nature.

The Jains, as is their wont, countenance both the permanence and impermanence of identity without acquiescing in either one-sided view scouted above. The most authoritative Jain doctrinal handbook—the Sanskrit That Which Is (Tattvārthasūtra) of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmi—defines an entity as that which is subject to origination, perdurance, and dissolution, thus giving equal place to the stability emphasized by Brahminical philosophers and the momentariness of Buddhists. As Jain philosophers of non-one-sidedness say, indeed, it is just this conjunction of contraries like permanence and impermanence that singles out any thing as the particular thing it is, persisting in its identity through its various states of empirical change.

One of the ways Jain philosophy accomplishes this ostensibly oxymoronic ontology is through a particular view of substance as precisely that which persists amidst change, as well as that in which change is seen to occur—that is, it is both the substrate of change as well as the substratum of attributes, both the basis of numerical identity and of qualitative identity. Moreover, according to Siddhasena’s classic Essay on the Dialectic of Proper Thinking (Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa), substance and the qualities that it possesses are equally real and inseparable. Haribhadra’s Victory-Flag of Non-One-Sidedness (Anekāntajayapatākā) furthermore suggests that both are equally necessary for the constitution of a thing’s identity. The basic, intuitive thesis of this work is that any real thing is what it is, and is not what it is not—a statement of the meaning of identity if ever there were one. What is at stake in this ostensibly trivial proposition is a certain view of the determinacy of identity: that to be is to exist as something—articulated in terms of attributes determined along various dimensions of predication—and not to exist as something else. To be self-identical, on this analysis, is to possess a certain configuration of qualitative identities.

The distinction between self and other is fundamental for Jain ontology; and it bears also on the more sociological issues involved in the qualitative identities that are most commonly at stake in the discourses of religious studies, namely, religious identities. A non-one-sided view of individuals is partially definitive of what it is to be Jain and not other than Jain. One-sided approaches tend to overemphasize certain kinds of praxis, such as purely gnoseological epiphanies, at the expense of more gradualistic negotiations between body and mind. Part of the way that Jains assert and maintain their religious identity is by philosophizing about identity itself.

Significant references/uses

Cort takes the kernel of Jain ontology to be the relationship of self and other—that is, soul and what is adventitious to it—but also means for this opposition to extend to the social identities of Jains in relation to non-Jains. Johnson has explicated how contestation over Jain views of the soul challenge and maintain the asceticism that is part of Jain social identity, and has suggested that the metaphysics of non-one-sidedness can serve as a bulwark against radical views threatening to obviate the physical rituals that make Jains who they are.

Related terms

Emic

ātman, jīva, puruṣa, svabhāva, śūnyatā, anekāntavāda, kṣaṇikavāda

Etic

Personal identity, qualitative identity, self, soul, momentariness, substance, attribute

References

Barbato, Melanie. Jain Approaches to Plurality: Identity As Dialogue. Leiden ; Boston: Rodopi Bv Editions, 2017.

Cort, John E. “Introduction.” In Open Boundaries: Jain Communities and Cultures in Indian History, edited by John E. Cort, 1–14. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1998.

Ganeri, Jonardon. Identity as Reasoned Choice: A South Asian Perspective on the Reach and Resources of Public and Practical Reason in Shaping Individual Identities. New York: Continuum, 2012.

Johnson, W. J. Harmless Souls: Karmic Bondage and Religious Change in Early Jainism with Special Reference to Umāsvāti and Kundakunda. 1st ed. Lala Sunder Lal Jain Research Series, vol. 9. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1995.

Kapstein, Matthew T. Reason’s Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian & Tibetan Buddhist Thought. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001.

Matilal, B. K. “A Note on the Jaina Concept of Substance.” Sambodhi 5, no. 2–3 (1976): 3–12.

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Anekāntavāda

(un-ake-AHN-tuh-VAH-duh) / non-one-sidedness

by Anil Mundra

Conceptual definition

Anekāntavāda, literally the “theory of non-one-sidedness” in Sanskrit, is a characteristically Jain metaphysical and semantic doctrine according to which any real and determinate thing admits of contrary predications. For example, a thing is classically said to be both existent and nonexistent; permanent and impermanent; universal and particular; and denotable and undenotable. The contradiction that would prima facie result from the application of such contrary pairs is averted by parameterizing each term so that it and its negation are not applied in the same way; for example, a thing is existent at one time and place, and nonexistent at another. The resultant propositions issue neither in contradiction nor in equivocation on the terms under discussion: “existent” and “nonexistent” remain genuine contraries, but the scope of their truthful application to a thing is now appropriately specified.

Philosophical significance

Anekāntavāda is thus a way to disambiguate language and fully determine the objects of discourse. Philosophers of non-one-sidedness take exception to the sweeping claims of universal scope that religious doctrines tend to promote about the fundamental nature of reality. They point out the ways in which such absolutist propositions fly in the face of common sense and undermine themselves. Take one of the most pressing examples of such claims in the context of South Asian religions: if one’s true self is said to be absolutely eternal, there would seem to be no way to account for its apparent change and (most importantly) progress toward the summum bonum; while if it is said to be absolutely transient and always in flux, there is no way to account for its continuation along such a progressive path. The self must thus be conceived as both permanent (qua substratum of change) and impermanent (in the progressive development of its states).

Historical context

The first intimations of the doctrine are found in the oldest Jain scriptures written in Prakrit. The founding figure of all current Jain traditions, the Jina Mahāvīra, tells questioners that the soul is permanent insofar as it continues, but impermanent insofar as it takes different forms in successive incarnations. Mahāvīra sometimes prefaces each of such contrary pronouncements with the qualification “in some way” (siyā in the original Prakrit). This hedge makes it clear why contrary predications can apply to the same thing consistently: they apply in different ways, and so do not contradict each other. These ways of applying predicates are often systematized in terms of a canonical group of parameters (called nikṣepas), such as place, time, substance, and state. While a predicate may be truly applied to an object at some values of these parameters, its contrary may be applied with equal truth at other values. In the scholastic period, this approach will come to be called syādvāda, the “in-some-way theory” (syāt being the Sanskrit equivalent of the hedge siyā).

The most authoritative Jain doctrinal handbook—the Sanskrit That Which Is (Tattvārthasūtra) of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmi around the middle of the first millennium C.E.—encapsulates the basic ontological insight of non-one-sidedness in its pronouncement that all existents are marked by arising, perdurance, and passing away. It also broaches a new way of parameterizing propositions: viewpoints (naya), i.e., contexts or methods through which propositions are to be interpreted. These viewpoints are said to complement the reliable means of awareness (pramāṇa) that are at the center of Indian epistemology. Siddhasena’s Introduction to Logic (Nyāyavatāra) elaborates this relationship by suggesting that reliable means of awareness serve to remove ignorance, while viewpoints provide access to partial truths that do not exclude contrary alternative views of the many-sided reality; but these various one-sided viewpoints can together fully determine an object through the use of syādvāda. The Essay on the Dialectic of Proper Thinking (Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa, which may or may not be by the same Siddhasena) undertakes to systematize the various viewpoints, proclaiming each one is correct in its own sphere and only there: non-one-sidedness thus demands that none of them be regarded as either absolutely right or absolutely wrong.

As scholastic Jain discourse develops in conversation with other religions in the lingua franca of Sanskrit in the latter half of the first millennium, anekāntavāda is increasingly applied to a range of philosophical dilemmas. Samantabhadra’s Investigation of Authorities (Āptamīmāṃsā) formatively tackles not only existence vs. nonexistence and permanence vs. impermanence, but also unity vs. diversity, identity vs. difference (particularly between cause and effect, substance vs. property, etc.), reason vs. scripture, and even the crucial ethical and soteriological issues of violence vs. nonviolence and the status of knowledge and ignorance vis-à-vis bondage and liberation. Haribhadra’s Victory-Flag of Non-One-Sidedness (Anekāntajayapatākā) and the works of Akalaṅka set the terms for the ensuing tradition by integrating Samantabhadra’s approach into the reigning idiom of Buddhist logic and metaphysics, turning anekāntavāda back against the Buddhist idealism that challenges the realism of rigoristic Jain asceticism.

By the time of Prabhācandra and the great polymath Hemacandra in the first half of the second millennium, both the nayavāda and syādvāda are accepted components of anekāntavāda.  The syādvāda, moreover, is now standardly considered not only to involve both affirmation and negation but also a third operator of inexpressibility (avaktavyatva/avācyatā), which is sometimes explained as encoding a fusion (per impossibile) of affirmation and negation. Later thinkers elaborate the formula (mentioned briefly in Siddhasena and Samantabhadra) of conjoining these three operators in every mathematical combination, so that syādvāda is now considered to involve a seven-fold (saptabhaṅgī) predication of contraries. And the nayavāda, for its part, is increasingly depicted as mapping extant philosophical schools, such that each is seen as affording its own partial view of reality.

Significant references/uses by contemporary scholars

Modern scholars have interpreted anekāntavāda in sundry ways: from “non-absolutism” (Mookerjee) and “non-extremism” (Sanghvi) to “relativity” (Balcerowicz) and “synthesis” (Matilal) or “syncretism” (Ganeri). Matilal’s influential reading rightly rejects Padmarajiah’s “indetermination” and Thomas’s idiosyncratic “non-unequivocality”; but Matilal’s own interpretation of Jain epistemology as “non-radicalism” or especially “intellectual ahiṃsā [nonviolence]” (following Dhruva) and “toleration” (following Kapadia) are not much better (Cort). We might say, in good non-one-sided fashion, that each of these glosses is applicable to anekāntavāda in some way but fails to unambiguously capture the thing itself in its full determinacy.

Related terms

Emic

syādvāda, nayavāda, nikṣepa, nyāsa, saptabhaṅgī, pramāṇa, syāt,

Etic

compossibility of contraries; determinate negation; non-absolutism; perspectivism; relativism; viewpoints;

References

Balcerowicz, Piotr. “Some Remarks on the Opening Sections in Jaina Epistemological Treatises.” In Śāstrārambha: Inquiries into the Preamble in Sanskrit, edited by W. Slaje. Abhandlungen Für Die Kunde Des Morgenlandes, Bd. 62. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2008.

Cort, John E. “‘Intellectual Ahiṃsā’ Revisited: Jain Tolerance and Intolerance of Others.” Philosophy East and West 50, no. 3 (2000): 324–47.

Dhruva, A. B. “Introduction.” In Syādvādamañjarī of Malliṣeṇa with the Anyayoga-Vyavaccheda-Dvātriṃśikā of Hemacandra, xiii-cxxv. Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 83. Bombay: Department of Public Instruction, 1933.

Dixit, K. K. Jaina Ontology. Lālabhāī Dalapatabhāī Granthamālā 31. Ahmedabad: LD Institute of Indology, 1971.

Ganeri, Jonardon. “Rationality, Harmony, and Perspective.” In Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Kapadia, H. R. “Introduction.” In Anekāntajayapatākā by Haribhadra Sūri, with His Own Commentary and Municandra Sūri’s Supercommentary, ix-cxxviii. Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 88/105. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1940.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekānta-Vāda). Ahmedabad: LD Institute of Indology, 1981.

Mookerjee, Satkari. The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism: A Critical Study of Anekāntavāda. 2nd ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.

Padmarajiah, Y. J. A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge. Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1963.

Sanghavi, Sukhlalji. “Anekāntavāda: The Principal Jaina Contribution to Logic.” In Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics, 15–28. Calcutta: R. K. Maitra; distributors: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1961.

Thomas, F. W. The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine: Syād-Vāda-Mañjarī. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968.

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Umsebenzi

by Herbert Moyo

Pronunciation – [úḿ̩séɓéⁿd̥zi̤]/ /úm̩seɓêːnzi/

This is a word that the Nguni, especially the Zulu and the Ndebele use to refer to specific rituals. The performance of a ritual is umsebenzi. In direct translation the word of umsebenzi means work. Ukwenza (doing/performing) umsebenzi (work) in this context means performing a ritual. The Nguni perform rituals for both the living and the living dead as contextual needs. The concept of umsebenzi has been overshadowed by the use of English words such as worship and veneration.

Of course, the little about the umsebenzi that is written was authored by church/Christian theologians from a Christian western frame of reference hence the distortion of umsebenzi to worship. The most criticised aspect of umsebenzi is the rituals performed for the living dead. Christians use their won term, worship, to define umsebenzi. Translation is problematic as we do not k now for sure how the words as meaning the same practice. The ideal example is the umsebenzi of ukubuyisa (the bringing home of the spirit of a deceased person).[1] This ritual has been recorded academics as worshipping the ancestors.[2] Some Nguni scholars and other African sympathisers have argued that Africans do not worship ancestors, but they venerate them. The problem is that the word veneration is a synonym of worship. The two words belong together.

This is related to the concept created by missionaries which they named African Traditional Religion (ATR). ATR is viewed as the religion of people who believe and worship ancestors. Their belief system is visible when they perform worship services. It is that which the outsider views as worship services which is umsebenzi. Offering a service to ancestors in as much as the ancestors also offer a service to the living by protecting them from witches. The process is reciprocal. Ancestors are in the spiritual realm and therefore can offer a service to the living living who are in the physical realm and therefore cannot operate in the spiritual realm. Ancestors then protect the living from spiritualities and bless the living living. Similarly, the living dead cannot brew beer or slaughter for themselves in the physical realm. The living living then offer a service to them by doing umsebenzi at the physical sphere.  

The word believe is an import brought by missionaries to the Nguni. In the Nguni way of life, there is no believing. Isintu is a way of life made up of taboos, rituals and observances performed in community.  The word belief is translated to kholwa. It is the same word that is used when people drink water, and they are satisfied they also Kholwa. The word kholwa means being satisfied. The believers are called ama-kholwa (those who believe). People who go to church are ama-kholwa. Religion is called inkolo (the belief). This fits well in Christianity because there is need to believe. However, in isintu there is no conversion and no believing, therefore isintu is not inkolo (religion) as there is nothing to believe in. It is in inkolo where there is worshipping when relating to the deity. In isintu there is no worshiping as there is no deity instead there are people with mutual respect who live in community. The community is composed of the living living, the living dead and the yet to be born. The living do umsebenzi of a physical nature for the living dead while the living dead also do umsebenzi of a spiritual nature for the living living. When the Nguni perform rituals to appease the living dead or during ukubuyisa, is doing umsebenzi.

Conclusion

There is so much of umsebenzi I have observed among the Ndebele. The most common one or the publicised one is ukubuyisa. In preparation for ukubuyisa there I umsebenzi which involves informing the ancestors about ukubuyisa. Usually, a goat is slaughtered to communicate with the ancestors. Another umsebenzi is the informing of the one to be brought home. The burial of a dead person is also called umsebenzi. The performance all forms of rites of passage according to isintu is umsebenzi.  Umsebenzi is the mirror of what amakholwa have called ukukholwa.

[1] See the work of Edwards, Steve. “Some southern African views on interconnectedness with special reference to indigenous knowledge.” Indilinga African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems 14, no. 2 (2015): 272-283.

[2] See Hammond‐Tooke, W. David. “Who worships whom: Agnates and ancestors among Nguni.” African Studies 44, no. 1 (1985): 47-64. See also Wanamaker, Charles A. “Jesus the ancestor: Reading the story of Jesus from an African Christian perspective.” Scriptura: Journal for Biblical, Theological and Contextual Hermeneutics 62 (1997): 281-298.

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Ubuntu

by Herbert Moyo

Pronounced – ùù -bú -ntúúú

Ubuntu is the acceptable normative character of umuntu in isintu. Ubuntu is character, umuntu (human being) and isintu (way of life). It is a word found among the Nguni. It is also found in translations across several other tribal groupings in Africa. Mqhayi found it safe to argue that ubuntu is for the “black people throughout Africa south of the Sahara.”[1] The ubuntu in one community may vary from the ubuntu from the next community in the many villages of Africa. However, if one behaves in a normative manner as per the values and principles that make ubuntu in that community then there is ubuntu in that context. A more focused argument comes from scholars that say ubuntu is an ethic for all bantu people.[2] In other words, African groups that are not part of the bantu may not subscribe to the ethic of ubuntu as they may not even such a word. John Hailey says the ubuntu comes “…from the root word ntu, from Bantu languages in Africa. Ntu meaning human, bantu meaning people, and ubuntu meaning humanity. Since it became popular…”[3] In the study of the philosophy of religion, theology, sociology and anthropology in African humanities the use of the term ubuntu is very popular from studies across AFRUCA. Interestingly scholars find it safe to use the word ubuntu even if they come from a language group that does not have that word, instead of translating they use ubuntu. Ubuntu has emerged as a term that is understood across African scholarship in the humanities. This includes scholars that are affirming the ubuntu ethic[4] and those that are critiquing ubuntu.[5]  I always find the critiques of ubuntu failing to consider that this is the ideal person. It one that society desires to produce as opposed to its anti-thesis. The critiques do not talk about the anti-thesis of ubuntu yet their criticism of ubuntu raises the characteristics of the opposite of the desired. The anti-thesis of ubuntu is ubulwane.

In Zulu and Ndebele languages, ubulwane (animal like) is a person that has the character of an animal, a wild one for that matter. Ubuntu is the opposite of ubulwane. In society you find both, people with ubuntu and those with ubulwane. Nonetheless, there is an ongoing philosophical debate from a variety of academic fields based on the ethic of ubuntu. On google scholar I have counted over 200 articles that talk about ubuntu. The basic is that if one is living their life according to the principles and values of isintu then such has ubuntu.[6] This African ethic of Ubuntu was made popular in the academic world by John Mbiti.[7] Ubuntu is an ethical concept or ideal behaviour that shows adherence to Isintu principles and values which manifests itself through communitarianism, using the humanness of individuals who constitute a community. An individual with ubuntu respects and practices the basics of isintu such as adherence to customs and traditions which revolves around communitarian relationships premised on respect for the self, the living dead, the living and the yet to be born. In a way, ubuntu is everyday normative behaviour by individuals in Isintuism. In fact, Ubuntu is an expression of Isintu through the behaviour of individuals in community to human beings and to other realities[8] such as animals, land, water, mountains and rivers. One who has ubuntu is one who is viewed as well behaved as per the Nguni worldview.

Even though ubuntu centres on the individual, the communitarian nature of the Nguni comes into the picture as the ubuntu cannot be practiced in isolation from other human beings. As already noted, that isintu requires other human beings, hence communitarianism. Ubuntu then becomes the ethic that drives the consciousness of the communally shared life-giving values such as relatedness, respect, communitarianism, hospitality and interdependency. These communitarian ubuntu values are passed on through generations for the well-being of the individual, the wider community and the environment. The definition of ubuntu is an ideal expression of the Isintu worldview.

The ubuntu of an individual becomes visible in relation to others. Michael Battle cites Desmond Tutu saying, ‘…a person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good…’[9] Ubuntu is a moral ethic of interdependence which contributes to social cohesion. The interesting aspect is that in ubuntu even strangers are treated with ubuntu and as such in the development of globalized communities the Nguni have no problem of accommodating others through the ethic of ubuntu. This takes us back to the principle that umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. Anyone who is individualistic is described as without ubuntu (akanabuntu) instead has ubulwane.

Conclusion

Ubuntu is a moral theory for interdependence and solidarity. It is an ethic based on self-respect and the respect of others in community. The individual finds meaning in serving others and therefore it builds love and care for others. Ubuntu demonstrates the rootedness of an individual in isintu and therefore from those who study the philosophy of religions it can be seen as the praxis of isintu. The individual is very important in community. the self can be meaningful through contributing to the wellbeing of others. The heroes of ubuntu sacrifice their well being for the sake of others, especial for the vulnerable.

[1] Mqhayi, S. E. K. Ityala Lamawele. Loved ale: Loved Ale Press. 1931: 134

[2] Ramose, Mogobe B. “Ubuntu.” In Degrowth, pp. 240-242. Routledge, 2014.

[3] Hailey, John. “Ubuntu: A literature review.” Document. London: Tutu Foundation (2008), pg. 14.

[4] See Letseka, Moeketsi. “In defence of Ubuntu.” Studies in philosophy and education 31, no. 1 (2012): 47-60.

[5] For example, See Matolino, Bernard, and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi. “The end of ubuntu.” South African Journal of Philosophy 32, no. 2 (2013): 197-205. See also

[6] Moyo, Herbert. “The Death of Isintu in Contemporary Technological Era: The Ethics of Sex Robots Among the Ndebele of Matabo.” In African Values, Ethics, and Technology, pp. 123-135. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021.

[7] Mbiti, J. S. (1971). African traditional religions and philosophy. New York: Doubleday.

[8] I would have said other creation, but the word creation came with the missionaries. The Nguni (Ndebele/Zulu) word is izidalwa. In the Nguni worldview people came from emhlangeni and in talking about that genesis of humans there is no use of the word creation or created.

[9] Battle, Michael. Ubuntu: I in you and you in me. Church Publishing, Inc., 2009.

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Isintu

by Herbert Moyo

Pronunciation – isíːntu/e—see-ntuu

Isintu is the totality of socio-economic, political and religio-cultural self-identity by the Nguni of Southern Africa (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Swaziland). There are traces of the Nguni in Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. The Nguni speak mainly four languages, Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele and Swati. The distribution of the languages is largely as follows: South Africa (Zulu; Xhosa; Ndebele; Swati), Zimbabwe (Zulu/Ndebele; Xhosa) and Swaziland/Eswatini (Swati). Since context transforms cultural patterns, there are some minor isintu variations amongst these Nguni. To avoid unsafe generalizations, I use examples mainly from the Ndebele of Zimbabwe[1], but also give some examples from the Zulu of South Africa and the Nguni in general. I do this because there is a tendency by people from other continents to treat Africans as culturally and linguistically monolithic yet there are over 1000 major languages and cultures in Africa.

As a philosophy of life, I refer to isintu as Isintuism. That which is normative is Isintu. Isintu also refers to that which the Nguni people have not lost despite the onslaught by imperial religions such as Christianity and Islam. Isintu has been affected by civilisation and globalization. Isintu has been affected ever since the colonial and missionary ‘globalization’ era. Therefore, those who continue to practice some Nguni rituals (Ndebele), speak isiNdebele language (use idioms and proverbs), observe some taboos and respect the Ndebele way of doing things are said to be doing Isintu. In fact, in everyday life if one does things according to the traditional way, then it is said “Uyenza Isintu sakithi (doing/living our isintu).”[2] This may be a ritual or being dressed in what is viewed as traditional attire (unxibe/ugqoke Isintu). Sticking to what is viewed as customs and traditions is Isintu. This is the same as what the Shona people of Zimbabwe, especially the Karanga would call Chivanhu (Isintu) chedu (sethu). The word Chivanhu is a direct translation of Isintu and the word chedu translates to the word ours. In the Shona worldview people who practice what is viewed as traditional are doing Chivanhu. What is of note is that in situations of sickness or difficulties in life, people who turn to traditional ways to solve such are said to be turning to Chivanhu. This is a philosophy that can be referred to as chivanhuism. The Chivanhuism just like isintuism is a worldview that embraces the indigenous way of life of the Shona.

In addition to the above understanding of isintu, the Zulu refer to all people, all Zulu people as Isintu or the human race as isintu. This is comprehensive us of the word as it means that all people in their being, their totality are Isintu. If understood this way, then isintu means the identity of the Zulu. This identity captures the socio-economic, cultural and political being of the Zulu.

Isintu is a normative Nguni way of life. Isintu is the living out of one’s life as a continuous practice of beliefs, customs and culture. Isintu involves the economy, dressing, respect for the living and the dead, socialization, growing up, taboos, marriage, death, building homes, celebrations, language and food. As per the Zulu understanding of isintu, it means the totality of being, religio-cultural realities, cosmology/worldviews. Isintu is life lived through a variety of rituals, observances and behavioural patterns that can be referred to as customs, tradition, culture or “religion”.

Isintu and or as a religion

In Isintuism, ideally, everyday life must always be pleasing to the living and to the living dead. This is a way of life through actions, relationships and words. It is this way of life that the Christian missionaries referred to as African Traditional Religion (ATR).[3] My development of isintuism is a response to this reference to isintu as ATR. The Nguni never claimed to have a religion until the advent of Christianity and Islam. ATR was invented by missionaries for Africans that had not converted to Christianity.[4] The Nguni lived their lives practicing all the above as they saw fit as per contextual needs. If others see this fitting the definition of what is called a religion, then that is fine. However, naming it in general terms as ATR has connotations of despising the practices as backward hence the onslaught on isintu by missionaries. The word ‘traditional’ in Africa connotes lack of civilisation. Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism[5]are also traditional religions yet they have specific names and not named as Traditional Religions. Because of the history of colonialism, it becomes offensive to refer to the lifestyle of the Nguni as ‘traditional religion’ hence the preferred use of Isintu. In Isintu there is no conversion, believing or worshipping (veneration), people are born into the system and live in the system. Others then decided to define this ATR. We debate on the use of veneration for what the Nguni do for ancestors. The synonyms for veneration are reverence, worship, respect, honour and adoration. The problem is the translation of these terms to Nguni languages and vice-versa, which dilutes the life practices of the Nguni with the mindset of the Christian which is full of these words in relation to God. The Nguni do umsebenzi[6] for their ancestors.

The individual in isintuism

In Isintuism, the individual ‘is’ because there are others. “I am because you are.”[7] Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu.[8] This means a person is person because of other persons. A human is fully human in relation to others in the community of the living, the living dead and the yet to be born. One cannot be human alone. The concept of individual derives meaning from the community. In isintuism the individual is very important as we cannot have a community without individuals that make up the community.

Conclusion

If the way of life of the Nguni has characteristics of a religion, then those who want to talk of the religion of the Nguni must talk about isintu. The Nguni religion is isintu and not ATR.

[1] The Ndebele people of Zimbabwe are Zulus from South Africa that travelled to Zimbabwe in the late 19th century because of conflicts.

[2] Moyo, Herbert. “The Death of Isintu in Contemporary Technological Era: The Ethics of Sex Robots Among the Ndebele of Matabo.” In African Values, Ethics, and Technology, pp. 123-135. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021.

[3] Ushe, Ushe Mike. “God, Divinities and Ancestors in African Traditional Religious Thought.” African Cultural Personalities in a World of Change: Monolithic Cultural Purity and the Emergence of New Values (2018): 1942.

[4] Shaw, Rosalind. “The invention of ‘African traditional religion’.” Religion 20, no. 4 (1990): 339-353.

[5] Yao, Xinzhong, and Hsin-chung Yao. An introduction to Confucianism. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

[6] This is my 3rd word for the purposes of this presentation.

[7] Idoniboye-Obu, Sakiemi, and Ayo Whetho. “Ubuntu: ‘You are because I am’ or ‘I am because you are’?.” inform 69 (2008): 70.

[8] Mbiti, J. S. (1971). African traditional religions and philosophy. New York: Doubleday. See also Shutte, Augustine. “Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu: an African conception of humanity.” Philosophy and Theology 5, no. 1 (1990): 39-54.